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Abstract
In a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accu-
mulation, we examine the eects of a debt policy rule under which the government
must reduce its debt{GDP ratio if it exceeds the criterion level. To sustain public
debt at a nite level, the government should adjust public spending rather than the
income tax rate. The long run debt{GDP ratio should be kept suciently low to
avoid equilibrium indeterminacy. Under sustainability and determinacy, a tighter
(looser) debt rule brings welfare gains when the world interest rate is relatively high
(low).
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1 Introduction
Discretionary scal policies during the 2008{2009 world crisis resulted in serious increases
in government debt in the Euro area. In 2011, the average debt{GDP ratio in the Euro
area reached 88 percent of GDP, some 20 percentage points higher than at the start of
the crisis in 2007. Public debt as a share of GDP in Greece equaled 166.1 percent in 2012.
Debt{GDP ratios in Italy, Ireland, and Portugal also exceeded 100 percent. These weak
scal conditions raised doubts about these countries' abilities to nance their increased
debt. As a response to the crisis, the EU has introduced strong scal consolidations under
the surveillance of the European Commission. Overall public decits were reduced thanks
to expenditure cuts, especially lower public investments, as stated in Public nances in
EMU (2012).1 According to the Stability and Convergence Programmes submitted to
the Commission and Council in Spring 2012, EU member states plan to base further
scal consolidation on expenditure cuts that include reductions in public investment.
According to the debt reduction benchmark introduced by the reform of the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), the so-called Six-Pack in December 2011, member states whose
current debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold have to reduce the distance to 60%
by an average rate of one-twentieth per year.2 It is important to investigate the eects of
the debt-reduction rule proposed by the SGP under its requirements.
Some authors have examined the eects of such a debt-reduction rule. In an endoge-
nous growth model whose growth engine is the ow of public service as in Barro (1990),
Futagami et al. (2008) investigate the eects of a government bond-issuance rule that
requires the government to reduce its debt at a steady pace if its debt is beyond the
criterion level. Maebayashi et al. (2013) uses an endogenous growth model whose engine
of growth is public capital accumulation to study the same issue. These authors provide
interesting results, but their investigations are conned to closed economies; accordingly,
1In the Euro area, the average general government decit fell from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2010 to 4.1
percent of GDP in 2011.
2The Maastrichit Treaty asks EU countries to keep their decit and debt levels below 3 and 60 percent,
respectively, to ensure compliance with budgetary discipline.
1
transactions in foreign capital markets are removed. In reality, both the government and
private sector can borrow and lend their assets in the foreign capital market. Countries
holding large levels of debt such as Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Portugal hold large external
debt as well. This shows the signicance of studying the debt policy rule described here
in a model of an open economy.
For our purpose, we consider an endogenously growing small open economy where the
government adopts a debt-reduction rule. As in Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky
(1997), public capital accumulated through public investment has positive eects on pri-
vate goods production. The government nances its spending on public investment by
imposing a tax on income and by issuing bonds. Public bond-issuance is under the re-
striction of the same debt policy rule as that in Futagami et al. (2008). We consider two
types of public nance budget regimes. In budgetary regime (I), if the debt{GDP ratio
exceeds the criterion level, the government adjusts its expenditure with a xed tax rate
to reduce this ratio. In budgetary regime (II), if the debt{GDP ratio exceeds the criterion
level, the government controls the tax rate to reduce its debt with a xed expenditure
ratio. In both regimes, the debt{GDP ratio tends to the criterion level in the long run.
The criterion level can be considered as the long-run debt{GDP ratio.
In budgetary regime (I), there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium. The long-run
debt{GDP ratio is a crucial determinant of the steady-state stability and equilibrium
(in)determinacy. When the long-run debt{GDP ratio is suciently low, the steady state
is saddle stable and hence exhibits equilibrium determinacy. However, if the government
sets a high criterion debt{GDP ratio, equilibrium indeterminacy arises because the steady
state is a sink or there exists a limit cycle around the steady state.3 The data in countries
in the Euro area show that the 60% criterion level of the debt{GDP ratio proposed by
the SGP may not be suciently low to ensure equilibrium determinacy.
3Some authors study the relation between scal policy and indeterminacy. Focusing on balanced
budget rules, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Harrison (2004, 2008) discuss the eects of
scal policies on equilibrium indeterminacy in closed economies. Farmer (1986) and Greiner (2007) show
that in closed economies, limit cycles emerge and equilibrium indeterminacy arises when the government
controls the value of its decit rather than the value of its debt.
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We also examine the welfare eects of debt reduction under budgetary regime (I),
assuming that the long-run debt{GDP ratio is suciently low to ensure determinacy.
The welfare eects of debt reduction depend on the rates of returns from private savings
and public investment. In our small open economy, the rate of return from private savings
is equal to the world interest rate. When the world interest rate is higher (lower) than the
rate of return from public investment, reductions in government debt improve (deteriorate)
welfare. Furthermore, the pace of debt reduction is an important determinant of the
magnitude of welfare gains (losses). When the world interest rate is higher than the rate
of return from public savings, the government can further improve welfare by reducing
the debt at a faster pace. In contrast, if the world interest rate is relatively low, the
government can mitigate welfare losses by reducing the debt at a slower pace.
In budgetary regime (II), there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium. However,
the steady state is always unstable under budgetary regime (II). Because the economy
cannot reach the unstable steady state, it makes little sense to study the characteris-
tics of the unstable steady state, and hence, we do not examine the welfare eects of
debt reduction in regime (II). Nevertheless, our model provides the following important
implication. Suppose that the initial private domestic savings cannot aord to absorb
the initial outstanding government debt and the government then borrows from foreign
investors. In such a situation, under regime (II), households eventually become overex-
tended with foreign debt, and there exists no equilibrium such that the government can
follow the debt-reduction rule. Then, regime (II) is unsuitable for sustaining public debt.
There exist studies on public debt nance in endogenous growth models where govern-
ment services or public capital are inputs for private goods production (see, e.g., Bruce
and Turnovsky (1999), Greiner and Semmler (2000), Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004),
Greiner (2007, 2012), and Yakita (2008)). These studies explore the policy implications
of public debt nance for equilibrium dynamics, long-run growth, and welfare. However,
few studies investigate the debt-reduction rule found in the Maastricht Treaty and the
SGP, except Futagami et al. (2008), Minea and Villieu (2013), and Maebayashi et al.
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(2013). The present study diers from these studies on the debt-reduction rule in the
following three points.
First, although these studies focus only on closed economies, we consider an open
economy and show that the openness of the economy provides important implications
for equilibrium (in)determinacy. Assuming that the public debt-to-private-capital ratio
is constrained by the debt-reduction rule and focusing only on regime (I), Futagami et
al. (2008) show that the debt-reduction rule may be a source of indeterminacy. However,
Minea and Villieu (2013) indicate that this result crucially depends on how to construct
the dynamic system, showing that indeterminacy never arises if the debt{GDP ratio is
used as the policy target as in the present model. Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that
indeterminacy does not arise in a closed economy version of our model. In contrast,
we show that the debt-reduction rule found in the SGP may be a source of equilibrium
indeterminacy in a small open economy.
Second, we provide sharp insights on the welfare eects of debt-reduction rules. Al-
though Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013) compare multiple balanced
growth paths in terms of growth rate, they do not conduct welfare analysis explicitly. Mae-
bayashi et al. (2013) conduct welfare analysis numerically in a closed economy model,
but they do not show the exact conditions under which debt reduction improves wel-
fare. We derive the analytical expression of the welfare eects and provide an intuitive
interpretation of them.
Finally, we shed light on how dierent budgetary regimes generate dierent macroe-
conomic consequences in a small open economy. In contrast to our study, Futagami et
al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013) focus only on regime (I). In a closed version of
our model, Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that under both regimes (I) and (II), a sad-
dle stable steady state exists. In our small open model, the stability of the steady state
under regime (I) crucially depends on the long-run debt{GDP ratio, whereas the steady
state is always unstable under regime (II), which implies that regime (II) is unsuitable
for sustaining public debt.
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Furthermore, our study is related to the literature on the relationship between scal
policy and sustainability of economies. It can be compared to the existing results on
scal sustainability. Assuming that the government adjusts the income tax rate in closed
economy models, Brauninger (2005) and Yakita (2008) show that when the initial debt is
too large, the debt{GDP ratio grows unboundedly; hence, public debt is not sustainable.4
These papers explore the conditions under which public debt can be sustained. In contrast,
we investigate which budgetary regime the government should adopt to sustain its debt.
Under regime (I), the government can sustain its debt on the condition that the criterion
level of the debt{GDP ratio is suciently low. However, if the government adopts regime
(II) when it borrows from foreign investors, households eventually become overextended
with foreign debt, and the economy loses the ability to pay back its debt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 investigates the local stability and social welfare under budgetary regime (I).
Section 4 examines budgetary regime (II). Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a small open economy. A single nal good is produced using labor, private
capital, and public capital (infrastructure). It is assumed that the nal good and private
capital are freely traded beyond the country's borders. However, individuals cannot mi-
grate, and public capital (social infrastructure) cannot cross borders. To construct social
infrastructure, the government must make public investments. 5
4Diamond (1965) and Chalk (2000) show that permanent budget decits cannot be sustainable unless
the interest rate is less than the growth rate in closed economies.
5The benchmark model assumes that the agents are faced with the constant world interest rate.
Following Chatterjee et al. (2003), Appendix G extends the benchmark model assuming that the interest
rate varies depending on the scal condition of the economy. This extension does not aect our main
results.
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2.1 Households
We consider a representative household. The size of the population is normalized to one.
Let Ct be consumption at time t. The utility of the representative household is given by
U0 =
Z +1
0
[lnCt]e
 tdt; (1)
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate. The household inelastically supplies one
unit of labor at each moment of time. The government imposes a tax on the household's
income, It  rAt+wt, where r is the (constant and exogenously given) world interest rate,
wt is the wage rate at time t, and At is the asset holdings of the household at time t. In
this small open economy, there are three types of assets, private capital (Kt), government
bonds (Bt), and foreign assets (FAt). Hence, we have At = Kt + Bt + FAt. If FAt < 0,
some fractions of private capital or government bonds are owned by foreign agents. We
assume that the tax takes the residence base form. Then, residents' income is taxed at
a uniform rate regardless of its source country, while non-residents' income is not taxed.
Thus, the ow budget constraint of the representative household is
_At = (1  t)It   Ct; (2)
where t denotes the income tax rate at time t. In contrast to Futagami et al. (2008) who
assume a constant tax rate, we allow t to vary over time, as we discuss later. In an open
economy, the household can borrow from foreign countries, and hence, At can be negative.
However, At must satisfy the no-Ponzi game (NPG) condition, limT!1AT e 
R T
t (1 v)rdv 
0. The household maximizes (1) subject to (2), which yields
_Ct = f(1  t)r   gCt; (3)
and the transversality condition (TVC), limT!1AT e 
R T
t (1 v)rdv = 0.
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2.2 Firms
As in Futagami et al. (1993), the production function of the representative rm is given
by Yt = F (Kt; Kg;tLt), where Yt, Kt, Kg;t, and Lt are output, private capital, stock
of infrastructure, and labor input at time t, respectively.6 The presence of Kg;t in the
production function reects the external eects. Infrastructure stock, Kg;t, accumulates
through government investments. The production function satises the standard neoclas-
sical characteristics, especially the constant returns to scale with respect to Kt and Kg;tLt.
Accordingly, we can transform this into the following intensive form:
Yt = F (xt; 1)Kg;tLt = f(xt)Kg;tLt; (4)
where xt  Kt=(Kg;tLt) and f(xt)  F (xt; 1). Given perfect competition and prot
maximization, we obtain
r = f 0(xt); (5a)
wt = ff(xt)  f 0(xt)xtgKg;t  !tKg;t: (5b)
The world interest rate, r, is constant because of the assumption of a small country. Thus,
xt and !t become constant over time. The following discussion omits time index t from
xt and !t. In equilibrium, we have Lt = 1. Then, Yt grows at the same rate as Kg;t (see
(4)). For later use, we dene Kg;t=Yt = 1=f(x)  kg.
2.3 Government
To construct infrastructure, the government makes public investments. The amount of
public investments in time t is denoted by Gt.
7 Then, stock of infrastructure accumulates
according to _Kg;t = Gt. For later use, we dene gt  Gt=Yt. The government nances its
6In contrast to us, Futagami et al. (2008) assume that the ow of public service enters the production
function as an input.
7As in Futagami et al. (1993), we ignore the depreciation of public capital to simplify the analysis.
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expenditure in two ways. One is by levying an income tax, and the other is by issuing
bonds. Thus, the government's budget constraint is
rBt +Gt = _Bt + t(rAt + wt); (6)
where Bt stands for outstanding government debt, and _Bt denotes newly-issued govern-
ment bonds. Using At = Kt + Bt + FAt, we rewrite (6) as _Bt = (1   t)rBt + Gt  
tfr(Kt + FAt) + wtg. If the government debt increases at a rate higher than (1   t)r,
no agents are willing to hold government bonds. Therefore, the government must satisfy
the NPG condition, limT!1BT e 
R T
t (1 v)rdv  0.
Similar to the reform of the SGP in 2011 for EU countries, we assume that the govern-
ment must reduce its debt{GDP ratio at a steady pace if its level is beyond the criterion
level. To simply formulate this rule, we follow Futagami et al. (2008) and assume that
the government adjusts its debt{GDP ratio, bt  Bt=Yt, according to the following rule:
_bt =  (bt   b);  > 0; (7)
where b > 0 and  > 0 represent the criterion level of the government's debt{GDP ratio
and the adjustment coecient of the rule, respectively. If bt > b holds, the government
reduces its debt by 100 percent of the dierence between the current and target levels
of b. Then, if  = 0:05 and b = 0:6, the debt policy rule, (7), is well suited to the debt
reduction benchmark introduced by the SGP (i.e., member states whose current debt{
GDP ratio is above 60 percent must reduce their debt{GDP ratio distance to 60 percent
by an average rate of one twentieth per year). We assume b0  b, because the average
debt{GDP ratio in the Euro area in 2011 reached 88 percent of GDP (which is higher
than the criterion level of 60 percent). If  takes a large (small) value, the government
adjusts bt to the criterion level at a fast (slow) pace.
Given this adjustment rule, the government chooses either t or gt to satisfy the budget
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constraint, (6).8 The present study considers two types of budgetary regimes: (I) the
government sets a constant  and adjusts gt to satisfy (6) and (7), or (II) the government
chooses a constant g, and t is then endogenously determined to satisfy (6) and (7).
3 Adjustments in Public Investments: Regime (I)
We rst consider the economy under budgetary regime (I), where the government sets a
constant  2 (0; 1) and adjusts public investments to satisfy (6) and (7). We begin with
the derivation of the dynamic system under regime (I). We dene ct  Ct=Yt, at  At=Yt,
and t  _Yt=Yt. Here, Yt is given by (4), x remains constant, Kg;t is a state variable, and
Lt = 1 holds in equilibrium. We then have to treat Yt as a predetermined variable. Then,
at and bt are state variables and ct is a jump variable. From (4) and _Kg;t = Gt, we have
gt = kgt. From (2), (3), (5b), (6), and the denitions of It and t, we obtain
_bt = (r   t)bt + gt   t(rat + !kg); (8a)
_at = f(1  t)r   tgat   ct + (1  t)!kg; (8b)
_ct = f(1  t)r     tgct: (8c)
Eliminating _bt from (7) and (8a) and solving for t using gt = kgt, we obtain
9
t

=
gt
kg

=
(rat + !kg)  rbt   (bt   b)
kg   bt  (at; bt): (9)
This equation shows that if the government reduces b, t decreases (increases) in the
short run if bt < (>)kg. The government can reduce its debt{GDP ratio in two ways.
One is reducing its debt, Bt, and the other is enhancing the output growth through public
investments. When bt is suciently small to satisfy bt < kg, the government can reduce
8Dividing both sides of (6) by Yt, we obtain _bt = (r   t)bt + gt   t(rat + !kg). The ow budget
constraint of the government is represented by t and gt. This is Equation (8a) we derive later.
9Because gt = kgt, the choice of gt is equivalent to that of t. When we discuss regime (I) in the
following, we mainly focus on t rather than gt.
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bt easier by reducing Bt rather than by enhancing output growth. In contrast, when
bt > kg holds, enhancing output growth is the easier way to reduce bt. Hence, when the
government reduces b, t decreases (increases) in the short run if bt < (>)kg. Note that (i)
the eects of reductions in b on t(= gt=kg) become stronger as  becomes larger, because
the government must reduce bt at a faster pace and (ii) eects on t(= gt=kg) gradually
disappear as bt becomes close to b.
Substituting (9) into (8b) and (8c) yields
_at = f(1  )r   (at; bt)gat   ct + (1  )!kg; (10a)
_ct = f(1  )r     (at; bt)gct: (10b)
The dynamic system is then given by (7), (10a), and (10b) together with the initial values,
b0 and a0.
3.1 Steady State and Stability
We derive the steady-state equilibrium where _bt = _at = _ct = 0 holds. We set _bt =
_at = _ct = 0 in (7), (10a), and (10b), and we solve for bt, at, ct, and t using (9). The
steady-state values of bt, at, ct, and t are, respectively, given by b

I =
b(> 0),
aI =
(I   !)kg + (+ r)b
r
; (11a)
cI =
I (+ !)kg + (+ r)b
r
> 0; (11b)
I = (1  )r   : (11c)
To ensure positive growth, we assume that I = (1  )r   > 0. From (11a), household
income at the steady state is given by (raI + !kg)Yt =
(r+)b+I kg

Yt that is apparently
positive. Because  2 (0; 1) and  > 0, we have I < (1  )r; this ensures TVC, because
_At=At = 

I holds at the steady state. The NPG condition of the government is also
satised because _Bt=Bt = 

I < (1  )r in the steady state. The policy parameters, b and
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, have no eects on the long-run growth rate, I . We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that I = (1 )r  > 0. There
exists a unique steady-state equilibrium where bI = b and (11a){(11c) hold. b and  have
no eects on the long-run growth rate, I .
We next examine the stability of the steady state characterized by bI = b and (11a){
(11c). We linearize the dynamic system around the steady state characterized by bI = b
and (11a){(11c), and then we obtain
0BBB@
_bt
_at
_ct
1CCCA =
0BBB@
  0 0
 @(aI ;b)
@bt
aI   @(a

I ;
b)
@at
aI  1
 @(aI ;b)
@bt
cI  @(a

I ;
b)
@at
cI 0
1CCCA
0BBB@
bt   b
at   aI
ct   cI
1CCCA ; (12)
where
@(aI ;b)
@bt
 @(at; bt)
@bt

(at;bt)=(aI ;b)
=  + + r
kg   b
;
@(aI ;b)
@at
 @(at; bt)
@at

(at;bt)=(aI ;b)
=
r
kg   b
: (13)
We denote the Jacobian matrix of (12) by M . Let us denote the (i; j) element of M by
mij (i; j = 1; 2; 3). One of the eigenvalues of M is equal to   < 0. The other two, 1
and 2, are the solutions of the characteristic equation 
(z)  z2 m22z +m32 = 0, thus
satisfying
1 + 2 = m22 =   @(a

I ;
b)
@at
aI and 1  2 = m32 =  
@(aI ;b)
@at
cI : (14)
The signs of m22 and m32 indicate the stability of the steady-state equilibrium and can
prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that I = (1  )r    > 0.
1. If b < kg, the steady state is locally saddle stable and exhibits local determinacy.
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2. If b > kg, the following hold:
(a) Let ~b  2+! (1 )r
2+r
kg. When  > r=!,
i. if kg < b < ~b, the steady state is locally stable and exhibits local indetermi-
nacy.
ii. if b > ~b, the steady state is locally unstable.10
(b) When  < r=!, the steady state is locally unstable.
(Proof) See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that when b is large (b > kg), the steady state becomes unsta-
ble under some conditions. However, this does not mean that there is no equilibrium.
Proposition 3 shows the possibility of an equilibrium that exhibits a limit cycle.
Proposition 3 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that I = (1   )r    > 0 and
b > kg. In addition, suppose that r=! < 1 and b^  < ~b < b^+ and that b is suciently close
to ~b, where b^  and b^+ are as dened in Appendix B. Then, there exists at least a limit
cycle around the steady state, and the steady state exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy.
(Proof) See Appendix B.
The properties of the equilibrium path heavily depend on b. When b is suciently small
to satisfy b < kg, the equilibrium path is uniquely determined. However, when b takes a
moderate value (kg < b < ~b) and  > r=! holds, the steady state is locally stable and
exhibits indeterminacy. In other cases, the steady state is unstable. However, as proven
in Proposition 3, there exists a limit cycle around the steady state. In Figures 1 and 2, we
illustrate a numerical example of a stable limit cycle.11 In this example, indeterminacy
arises because there are multiple equilibrium paths that converge to a stable limit cycle.
10Note that ~b is larger than kg if  > r=! holds. See Appendix A.
11In this example, we assume the Cobb{Douglas production function: Yt = Kt
(Kg;tLt)
1 . We use
the following parameters:  = 0:36, r = 0:03,  = 0:01,  = 0:05, and  = 0:3. Under these parameters,
we have !  2:59, kg  0:25, b^   2:01, b^+  238:61, and ~b  6:612. We then assume that b0  6:613.
These values satisfy 1 >  > r=!, b > kg, and b^  < ~b < b^+.
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Figure 1: An Example of Limit Cycle
The intuition behind indeterminacy is as follows: Suppose that households expect
future increases in Gt. Because increases in Gt have positive eects on output growth
and labor wage (see (4) and (5b)), this expectation implies that households also expect
future increases in output growth and labor income. Households then have a lesser in-
centive to save, and at thus decreases in the future. As a result, the government's tax
revenue decreases, which tightens its budget constraint. As discussed just below (9), the
government|which is constrained with tight budgets|has two ways to reduce bt  Bt=Yt
according to (7): one is to reduce the debt, Bt, which requires reductions in public in-
vestments, Gt, and the other is to increase public investments, Gt, in order to stimulate
output growth. When bt > kg holds, enhancing output growth is an easier way to reduce
bt than paying back Bt. Then, if b > kg, households' expectations are self-fullling and
equilibrium indeterminacy arises. In the numerical example of the limit cycle in Figure
2, government spending and private asset holdings move in opposite directions, which is
13
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Figure 2: Fluctuations of (gt; at; ct)
consistent with this interpretation for indeterminacy. When bt < kg, the government can
reduce bt easier by paying back Bt rather than by enhancing output growth. Then, if
b < kg, expectations of future increases in Gt are not self-fullling. Hence, the steady
state exhibits equilibrium determinacy.
Proposition 2 also shows that the equilibrium determinacy condition is independent of
. Intuitively, equilibrium determinacy depends only on the directions of the simultaneous
movement of (bt; at; ct) as explained above. Because adjustment speed  does not change
the directions,  does not aect equilibrium determinacy.
Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that in a closed economy where the government follows
(7) and adopts regime (I), equilibrium indeterminacy does not arise. Consider a closed
economy where public capital is productive. As in our open economy, increases in public
investments have positive growth eects. Concurrently, increases in public investments
14
year Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK
1990 49.0 68.9 52.5 32.0 40.9 40.2 48.4 48.5
1991 49.7 67.8 52.4 32.2 43.1 41.5 50.2 49.6
1992 50.6 66.8 52.5 33.4 45.9 43.1 51.7 49.8
1993 52.1 66.9 52.7 36.4 48.8 45.0 53.4 49.1
1994 51.6 65.2 51.3 38.5 49.9 44.2 54.4 47.5
1995 50.4 64.3 50.6 38.9 50.7 44.1 55.5 46.8
1996 50.1 62.9 49.4 39.5 51.2 44.9 56.4 46.0
1997 49.4 61.2 48.4 40.5 50.3 45.0 56.3 44.4
1998 48.9 59.2 48.9 41.4 49.3 44.0 55.7 42.9
1999 48.6 57.6 50.1 42.3 48.7 42.8 55.6 41.8
2000 47.9 56.4 50.5 43.3 48.0 42.0 54.7 40.3
2001 47.5 56.7 50.9 44.4 47.8 42.0 54.7 39.3
average 49.7 62.8 50.9 38.6 47.9 43.2 53.9 45.5
Table 1: Real government net capital stocks as a percentage of real GDP (data source:
Database on Capital Stocks in OECD Countries of Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
crowd out private investments, which counteracts the positive growth eects. Then, the
growth eects of increases in public investments become weaker compared to those in
our small open economy. The government|constrained with tight budgets|has only
one choice: to cut public investments to pay back its debt. Households' expectations of
increases in Gt are not self-fullling, and thus indeterminacy does not arise in a closed
economy. In contrast, because an open economy can import capital from abroad and
because economic activities in a small economy do not aect the world resource constraint,
increases in public investments do not necessarily crowd out private investments in a small
open economy and can thus have stronger growth eects. As such, in our small open
economy, equilibrium indeterminacy can arise under some conditions.
Finally, we refer to an empirical implication of the determinacy condition: b < kg.
Table 1 shows the real government net capital stocks as a percentage of real GDP
from 1990 to 2001 in several countries in the Euro area.12 On average, except in the
12Constructing new data is not the scope of this paper. Therefore, we use existing data provided
by the Database on Capital Stocks in OECD Countries of Kiel Institute for the World Economy. It
is downloadable at http://www.ifw-kiel.de/forschung/Daten/netcap. Because only data up to 2001 are
available for our purpose, we focus on data from 1990 to 2001. For details on data construction, see
Kamps (2006).
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Netherlands, the 60% criterion level of the debt{GDP ratio proposed by the SGP may
not be suciently low to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Besides, this result holds stably
in that term.
3.2 Welfare Analysis
To examine the welfare eects of reductions in b under budgetary regime (I), we consider
the following scenario. The economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium charac-
terized by bI = b and (11a){(11c). At time 0, the government unexpectedly reduces b
marginally. After marginal reductions in b, if the new steady state is stable, the economy
begins to move toward the new steady state. If the steady state exhibits local indetermi-
nacy, the transitional path is not unique and welfare eects of this policy change cannot
be examined. Hence, here, we assume b < kg to ensure determinacy. However, we analyze
the case of indeterminacy in an extended model where the interest rate depends on the
scal conditions of the economy. See Appendix G.
Our welfare measure is (1). Because Ct = C0e
f(1 )r gt = c0f(x)Kg;0ef(1 )r gt, we
can rewrite (1) as
U0 =
1

ln c0 +
1


ln f(x)Kg;0 +
(1  )r   


: (15)
When the government unexpectedly reduces b at time 0, c0 jumps to its new value just
at time 0; however, other variables in (15) do not change. Then, marginal reductions in
b aect household welfare only through c0. Because b < kg holds and the steady state
is saddle-stable, we can consider 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 as solutions of the characteristic
equation 
(z) = 0, as shown in Subsection 3.1. Appendix C shows that using 2 > 0, c0
can be expressed as
c0 = c

I + (b0   b)v3 + fa0   aI   (b0   b)v2g2; (16)
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where v2 and v3 are dened in (C.3a) and (C.3b).
We now explain our scenario in more detail. Initially, b is set equal to binit. We denote
the initial steady-state value of at as a
init
I . Because the economy is initially in the steady-
state equilibrium, we have b0 = b
init and a0 = a
init
I in (16). Denote the criterion level of
bt and the steady-state value of at after the policy change as b
new and anewI , respectively.
Because we consider marginal changes, bnew and anewI are approximately equal to
binit and
ainitI , respectively. This generates b0 =
binit  bnew and a0 = ainitI  anewI . After the policy
change, we have b = bnew and aI = a
new
I in (16), which implies that b0 b = binit bnew  0
and a0  aI = ainitI   anewI  0. Then, the eect of marginal changes in b can be expressed
as
@c0
@b

(b0;a0)(bnew;anewI )
=
@cI
@b
  @a

I
@b
2 + v22   v3;
=
2   
r

2(+ + r)
+ 2
  (+ r)

 	(): (17)
The calculation procedure from the rst to the second lines in (17) is presented in Ap-
pendix D. We can easily show that 2    > 0 and 	(0) = 0.13 Dierentiating 	(), we
obtain
	0() =
2(2   )
r(+ 2)
f2   (+ r)g:
We can show that if r < (>)! holds, we have  + r < (>)2.
14 Then, if r < (>)!,
	() > (<)0 and 	0() > (<)0 for  > 0. From (15), we obtain @U0=@b

(b0;a0)(bnew;anewI )
=
	()=cI . Because  has no eect on c

I , the discussion so far yields the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that I = (1   )r    > 0 and
b < kg and that the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium.
132 is a solution of 
(z) = 0. 0 < z < 2 (z > 2) if 
(z) < (>)0 holds for z > 0. Because

() = 2  m22+m32 =  (1  )!kgr=(kg   b) < 0, we have 2    > 0.
14As in footnote 13, 0 < z < 2 (z > 2) holds if 
(z) < (>)0 holds for z > 0. We have 
( + r) =
rkg(r   !)=(kg   b). Because b < kg is assumed, + r < (>)2 if r < (>)!.
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(a) If r < ! holds, marginal reductions in b reduce households' welfare. As  > 0 becomes
smaller, reductions in household welfare also become smaller.
(b) If r > ! holds, marginal reductions in b raise households' welfare. As  > 0 increases,
increases in household welfare also become larger.
The welfare eects of reductions in b depend on the relationship between r and !.
When r > !, reductions in b improve welfare. Furthermore, the value of  provides
an important implication. When r > !, the government can further improve welfare by
reducing bt at a faster pace. In contrast, when r < !, the government can mitigate welfare
losses by reducing bt at a slower pace.
To interpret Proposition 4 intuitively, we rewrite households' income, It = rAt+wt, as
It = rAt+!Kg;t by using (5b). Households' income depends on their assets, At, and public
capital, Kg;t. At accumulates through savings of the private sector (households), whereas
Kg;t accumulates through public investments by the government. We can consider public
investments as savings of the public sector. Consequently, r and ! can be considered the
rates of return on private and public savings, respectively. If r < ! holds, accumulating
assets through public savings is socially more ecient. Because reductions in b have
negative eects on public investments (savings) when b < kg holds as discussed below (9),
reductions in b reduce households' welfare. When  is small, the initial decline in t is
also small, which mitigates the negative welfare eects. When r > ! holds, accumulating
assets through public savings is not socially ecient. Because reductions in b depress
public investments (savings), welfare improves. When  is large, the initial decline in
t is also large. Then, public investments are further depressed and households' welfare
further improves.
4 Tax Adjustments: Regime(II)
We now move onto budgetary regime (II), where the government sets a constant (= g=kg)
and adjusts t to satisfy (7) and (8a). Under regime (II), it will be shown that there exists
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a unique unstable steady state. This is a new result by considering a small open economy
because Maebayashi et al. (2013) have shown that the steady state is stable under regime
(II) in the closed economy.
We rst derive the dynamic system. Eliminating _bt from (7) and (8a) and solving for
t, we obtain
t =
(r   )bt + kg + (bt   b)
rat + !kg
 (at; bt): (18)
When the government reduces b, t increases in the short run because the government
must earn a larger primary surplus to reduce bt. The eect on t becomes stronger as 
increases and gradually disappears as bt approaches b. The following two points should
be mentioned. First, when at =  !kg=r, t cannot be dened; thus, the optimization
problem of the household is not well-dened. Then, the transitional paths along which at
moves across  !kg=r must not be equilibrium. Second, when at is so small that household
income (rat + !kg)Yt is negative, t tends to be negative; thus, household tax payments
t(rat + !kg)Yt tend to be positive despite that household income is negative. Then,
the representative household must borrow from abroad to make tax payments beyond its
income. In other words, the government forces the household to borrow from abroad in
order to meet the budget constraint of the government. Although the case makes little
sense in practice, it is theoretically possible and provides important implications as we
later show. Substituting (18) into (8b) and (8c) yields
_at = (r   )(at   bt)  (bt   b)  ct + (!   )kg; (19a)
_ct = f(1  (at; bt))r     gct: (19b)
The dynamic system is given by (7), (19a), and (19b) along with b0 and a0.
We next derive the steady-state equilibrium, where _bt = _at = _ct = 0 holds. We set
_bt = _at = _ct = 0 in (7), (18), (19a), and (19b), and we solve for bt, at, ct, and t. The
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steady-state values of bt, at, ct, and t are respectively given by b

II =
b(> 0),
aII =
(r   )b+ kg
r       
!kg
r
; (20a)
cII =
(r   )b+ kg
r      +
!kg
r
; (20b)
 II =
r   (+ )
r
: (20c)
From (20a), households' income is given by (raII + !kg)Yt =
(r )b+kg
r   rYt at the steady
state. If  < r    holds, the steady-state income level becomes strictly positive. This
inequality ensures that  II 2 (0; 1) and cII > 0. Accordingly, the remainder of this section
assumes that  < r   . Because _At=At = _Bt=Bt =  holds in the steady state and (20c)
implies (1   II)r    =  > 0, the TVC of the household and the NPG condition of the
government are both satised.
As shown in Appendix E, the Jacobian matrix of the linearized dynamic system has
only one stable root,  . Because there are two state variables, bt and at, the economy
cannot approach the steady-state equilibrium unless b0 and a0 are respectively equal to b
and aII by chance. We thus obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider budgetary regime (II). Suppose that  < r   . There exists a
unique steady-state equilibrium where bII = b and (20a){(20c) hold. Unless b0 and a0 are
equal to b and aII , respectively, the economy cannot approach the steady-state equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 5 is as follows. We focus on the marginal rate of intertem-
poral substitution in the Euler equation of the household. Under regime (II), the income
tax rate is inversely related to asset holding of the household. When at is lower (higher)
than that of the steady state, the income tax rate is raised (lowered) to nance the con-
stant government spending. This lowers (raises) the rate of return of savings. Then, the
household decreases (increases) asset holdings and at gets away from the steady state.
Therefore, the steady state is unstable in regime (II).
Because the economy cannot reach the unstable steady-state equilibrium, it makes
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little sense to continue studying the characteristics of the steady state. However, our
model provides other important implications. Using (7), we solve (19a) and then rearrange
the solution using inequality ct > 0:
15
at < bt +

(a0   b0) + !   
r    kg

e(r )t   !   
r    kg: (21)
Note that the debt rule, (7), ensures limt!+1 bt = b and r    > 0 is assumed. Suppose
that a0  b0 is suciently small so that a0  b0 <  (!  )kg=(r  ). Then, (21) implies
limt!1 at =  1. If a0 >  !kg=r holds, at necessarily moves across  !kg=r. As discussed
below (18), such transitional paths cannot be an equilibrium, because t is not dened at
at =  !kg=r and the households' optimization problem is not well-dened.
It is also shown that even if a0 <  !kg=r holds and at does not move across  !kg=r
along the transition, there exists no equilibrium. As shown in (18), t tends to zero as at
tends to  1. Then, for a large t, the discounted sum of households' labor income can be
written as
Z +1
t
(1  v)wve 
R v
t (1 s)rdsdv =
Z +1
t
!kgYve
 r(v t)dv =
!kg
r   Yt > 0: (22)
In the rst equality, we use t = 0 for a large t, (5b), and the denition of kg. The second
equality uses _Yt=Yt =  and r > . The assumption  < r   (< r) ensures the last
inequality. Because at =  1 for a large t, the inequality  at > !kg=(r   ) holds for a
large t. From (22) and the denition of at, the following inequality is obtained for a large
t:
 At >
Z +1
t
(1  v)wve 
R v
t (1 s)rdsdv:
This inequality implies that for a large t, households' borrowing eventually exceeds the
discounted sum of their labor income, and households would thus be unable to pay o
15Appendix G provides the derivation of (21).
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their borrowing. Therefore, rational expectations and perfect foresight ensure that foreign
agents do not lend to such households. The next remark summarizes the discussion so
far.
Remark
Consider budgetary regime (II). Suppose that  < r  and a0  b0 <  (! )kg=(r ).
Then, there exists no equilibrium such that the government can follow the debt-reduction
rule, (7).
Inequality a0   b0 <  (!   )kg=(r   ) indicates that households' initial asset hold-
ings tend to be smaller than the government's initial outstanding debt, which means that
private domestic savings cannot absorb the outstanding government debt; thus, the gov-
ernment borrows from foreign investors. Our result implies that in such a case, under
regime (II), households eventually become overextended with foreign debt. Therefore,
there exists no equilibrium where the government can follow the debt-reduction rule, (7).
Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that in a closed economy where the government follows
(7) and adopts budgetary regime (II), the unique steady state is always saddle stable and
the economy converges to the steady state where the debt{GDP ratio remains constant
over time. Then, there always exists an equilibrium where the government can follow the
debt-reduction rule, (7), if it is a closed economy. To reduce its debt{GDP ratio, the
government imposes a high tax rate on the interest income under regime (II) (see (18)),
which discourages household savings and negatively aects at. However, households in
a closed economy cannot borrow from abroad, and hence, at cannot be smaller than bt.
Therefore, households in a closed economy do not lose the ability to pay back debt. In
contrast, because households in an open economy can borrow from abroad and because
households in a small economy do not aect the world asset market, households in a small
open economy are at risk of becoming overextended with foreign debt (although this does
not happen in equilibrium).
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5 Concluding Remarks
We examine how the debt-reduction rule found in the SGP aects the dynamics of the
economy and welfare in a small open economy model where the government can borrow
from abroad to nance its debt. Public capital accumulated by public investments has
positive externalities on goods production.
In budgetary regime (I), where the government controls public spending to follow a
debt policy rule, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium. When the long-run debt{
GDP ratio is suciently low (high), the steady state exhibits (in)determinacy. Focusing
on the case where the steady state exhibits determinacy, we obtain the following welfare
implications. If the rate of return from private savings is larger (smaller) than that
from public savings, reductions in government debt improve (reduce) welfare and the
government can realize (may suer) larger welfare gains (losses) by reducing its debt at
a faster pace. In budgetary regime (II), where the government controls the income tax
rate to follow a debt policy rule, the steady state is always unstable. If the initial asset
holdings of households are smaller than the initial outstanding government debt, there
exists no equilibrium where the government can follow the debt-reduction rule, (7).
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
1. If b < kg holds, we have m32 < 0 because c

I > 0 and @(a

I ;
b)=@at = r=(kg   b) > 0
(see (13)). From the second equation of (14), one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
in (12) is negative while the other is positive. Then, the steady state is locally saddle
stable and exhibits local determinacy.
2. If b > kg holds, m32 > 0 (see (14) and (13)). Using (11a) and (13), we rewrite m22 as
m22 =
f(1  )r   2  !gkg + (2+ r)b
b  kg
: (A.1)
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(a) If  > r=! holds, (1   )r   2   ! takes a negative value. Let ~b  2+! (1 )r
2+r
kg.
Then, if kg < b < ~b holds, m22 < 0. Inequality  > r=! ensures that
2+! (1 )r
2+r
=
1 + ! r
2+r
> 1 and thus ensures the existence of a b that satises kg < b < ~b. From
m22 < 0, m32 > 0, and (14), we know that the real parts of both 1 and 2 are negative.
The steady state is locally stable and exhibits local indeterminacy.
If b > ~b holds, b > kg because inequality  > r=! ensures that
2+! (1 )r
2+r
= 1 +
! r
2+r
> 1. Then, m22 > 0 and m32 > 0, which implies that the real parts of the two
eigenvalues are positive.
(b) We now examine the signs of m22 and m32 in the case of  < r=! and b > kg. m32 > 0
holds. Because b > kg, we have
m22 >
f(1  )r   2  !gkg + (2+ r)kg
b  kg
=
r   !
b  kg
kg
> 0:
Then, m22 > 0 and m32 > 0, which implies that the real parts of the two eigenvalues are
positive.
B Proof of Proposition 3
We show the existence of limit cycles by applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem.16 Because
Jacobian matrixM (dened in (12)) has one negative eigenvalue,  , the dynamic system
can exhibit Hopf bifurcation if its submatrix
M 0 
0@   @(aI ;b)@at aI  1
 @(aI ;b)
@at
cI 0
1A
16To see the Hopf bifurcation theorem in detail, refer to Theorem 3.4.2 (pp. 151) of Guckenheimer and
Holmes (1983).
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has a couple of complex eigenvalues. A necessary and sucient condition for complex
eigenvalues is (trM 0)2   4detM 0 < 0, that is,17

  r
kg   b
aI
2
<  4 r
kg   b
cI : (B.1)
Substituting (11a) and (11b) into (B.1), we obtain
"
  (

I   !)kg + (+ r)b
kg   b
#2
<  4

I (+ !)kg + (+ r)
b
kg   b
:
Multiplying both sides by (kg   b)2 and arranging it as a polynomial of b, we have
(r)2b2   2r(1  )(!   r) + !kgb+ (1  )r + !2k2g < 0: (B.2)
The critical values of quadratic inequality (B.2) are
b^   (1  )(!   r) + !   2
p
(1  )(!   r)!
r
;
b^+  (1  )(!   r) + ! + 2
p
(1  )(!   r)!
r
;
where these real numbers are well-dened under the assumption that r=! < 1. Thus, a
necessary and sucient condition for complex eigenvalues is b^  < b < b^+. M 0 has complex
eigenvalues because b^  < ~b < b^+. The real part of these eigenvalues, detM
0
2
= m22
2
, equals
zero only when b = ~b; it is also dierentiable and increasing in b. Thus, ~b is the unique
bifurcation value of parameter b, and submatrix M 0 has a couple of complex eigenvalues
in any suciently small neighborhood of ~b. Therefore, by the Hopf bifurcation theorem,
there exists a suciently small " > 0 such that either of the following cases is true: (i)
there exists a stable limit cycle for every b such that ~b < b < ~b+ ", or (ii) there exists an
unstable limit cycle for every b such that ~b   " < b < ~b. Because any solution emerging
17This inequality requires b > kg, and holds even in case 2.(a).ii of Proposition 2 where  >
r
! and
b > ~b, as mentioned previously.
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from the neighborhoods of the cycle winds around it in case (i) and remains in the cycle
(asymptotically on the (at; ct) plane) in case (ii), there are innumerable initial values of ct
consistent with TVC in each case. This implies the multiplicity of equilibria. The proof
of Proposition 3 is thus complete.
C Derivation of c0
We derive the saddle path that converges to the steady state we consider. Because b < kg
holds, we can assume 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. Because m32 < 0 holds in the case of b < kg
(see Appendix A),
p
m222   4m32 > jm22j. Then, 1 and 2 are given by
1 =
m22  
p
m222   4m32
2
< 0 and 2 =
m22 +
p
m222   4m32
2
> 0: (C.1)
Given b0 and a0, we solve (12) and obtain
0BBB@
bt
at
ct
1CCCA =
0BBB@
bI
aI
cI
1CCCA+ 1
0BBB@
1
v2
v3
1CCCA e t + 2
0BBB@
0
1
2
1CCCA e1t: (C.2)
In (C.2), 1  b0 b and 2  a0  aI   (b0 b)v2 are determined by the initial condition.
Vectors (1 v2 v3)
T and (0 1 2)
T are the eigenvectors associated with eigenvalues   and
1, respectively.
18 v2 and v3 are expressed as
v2 =
m11m21  m31
m11(m11  m22) +m32 =
@(aI ;b)
@bt
aI + c

I
2 +m22+m32
=
@(aI ;b)
@bt
aI + c

I
(+ 1)(+ 2)
;
(C.3a)
v3 =
(m11  m22)m31 +m21m32
m11(m11  m22) +m32 =
@(aI ;b)
@bt
(+ )cI
2 +m22+m32
=
@(aI ;b)
@bt
(+ )cI
(+ 1)(+ 2)
:
(C.3b)
18To derive the eigenvector associated with 1, we use (14). Let us denote the eigenvector as v^
T 
(v^1 1 v^3)
T . From Mv^ = v^, we obtain v^1 = 0 and v^3 = m22   1 = m32=1. Then, the two equations of
(14) imply that v^3 = 2.
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In (C.3a) and (C.3b), we use (14), which implies that 2+m22+m32 = (+1)(+2).
From (C.2), c0 is given by (16).
D Derivation of (17)
From (11a) and (11b), we have @aI=@b = (+ r)=(r) and @c

I=@
b = @aI=@b. Using the
denitions of v2 and v3, we rearrange v2  v3 as
v22   v3 = + + r
(kg   b)(+ 1)(+ 2)
f(  2)cI + (cI   2aI )g: (D.1)
Because 2 is a solution of 
(z) = 0, 
(2) = 2
2  m222 +m32 = 0, which implies that
cI   2aI =

@(aI ;b)
@at
 1
2(2   );
where @(aI ;b)=@at is given by (13). In deriving this equation, we use the denitions of
m22 and m32. Substituting this equation into (D.1) yields
v22   v3 = (2   )(+ + r)
r(+ 1)(+ 2)

2   @(a

I ;
b)
@at
cI

;
=
(2   )(+ + r)
r(+ 1)(+ 2)
(2 +m32) ;
=
(2   )2(+ + r)
r(+ 2)
:
On the second line, we use the denition ofm32. The second equation of (14) is used on the
last line. Substituting the above equation, @aI=@b = (+ r)=(r) and @c

I=@
b = @aI=@b
into the rst line of (17) yields the second line of (17).
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E Stability of the Steady State: Regime (II)
To examine the stability of the steady-state equilibrium, we linearize the dynamic system
around the steady state characterized by bII = b and (20a){(20c):
0BBB@
_bt
_at
_ct
1CCCA =
0BBB@
  0 0
 (r    + ) r     1
  r +
raII+!kg
rcII
r  
raII+!kg
rcII 0
1CCCA
0BBB@
bt   b
at   aII
ct   cII
1CCCA :
One of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is given by   < 0. The other two, 1
and 2, satisfy 1 + 2 = r    > 0 and 1  2 = r  raII+!kg rc

II > 0. These inequalities
hold because  < r    is assumed. The real parts of both 1 and 2 are positive. There
are two state variables, bt and at. Unless b0 and a0 are respectively equal to b and a

II by
chance, the economy cannot achieve the steady-state equilibrium.
F Derivation of (21)
We dene zt  at   bt. Using (7) and the denition of zt, we rewrite (19a) as _zt =
(r   )zt   ct + (!   )kg. Given z0  a0   b0, the solution for this is
zt =

z0 +
!   
r    kg

e(r )t   !   
r    kg  
Z t
0
cve
(r )(t v)dv:
Because ct > 0 holds for all t  0, this equation implies the following inequality:
zt <

z0 +
!   
r    kg

e(r )t   !   
r    kg:
Substituting zt = at   bt into this equation yields (21).
G An Extention: Variable Interest Rate
We extend the model in the main text to include an interest rate that is aected by an
endogenous variable representative of the scal conditions of the economy. Intuitively,
28
even in a small open economy, an interest rate for the agents in the economy can vary
according to scal conditions because the risk premium for debt depends on them.
Some works such as Chatterjee et al. (2003) incorporate it in the following way. Let
nt =
Bt At
Yt
. This is net foreign debt per GDP. We think of this as an indicator of scal
conditions and interest rate rt depends on nt:
rt = r(nt) > 0;
where r() is a nondecreasing function. Following Chatterjee et al. (2003), we adopt the
following specication of r() when we conduct numerical analyses:
rt = r
 + exp(nt)  1  r(nt); (G.1)
where r is a constant and parameter  > 0 is response strength of the interest rate for the
scal conditions. When nt > 0, the economy borrows from abroad and then the interest
rate for the economy rises from natural level r, which reects a risk premium.
G.1 Model
We incorporate a positive rate of depreciation of private capital, denoted by k, and adopt
a Cobb{Douglas type production function. The prot of the representative rm is
Kt (Kg;tLt)
1    (rt + k)Kt   wtLt: (G.2)
By (G.2), the rst-order conditions of the rm's problem are
rt = x
 1
t   k; (G.3)
wt = (1  )xt Kg;t; (G.4)
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where xt =
Kt
Kg;tLt
. From (G.3) and (G.4), we have
xt =


r(nt) + k
 1
1 
 x(nt):
Besides, public capital-to-GDP ratio is
kg;t =
Kg;t
Yt
=
1
x(nt)
 kg(nt):
Note that by the specication of r(), the price system and other key variables depend on
nt and vary with time.
The government adopts the same debt policy rule:
_bt =  (bt   b);
and faces the ow-budget constraint
rtBt +Gt = _Bt + (rtAt + wt):
For numerical analyses, we assume a positive rate of depreciation for public capital, de-
noted by g. The dynamic equation of public capital accumulation is
_Kg;t = Gt   gKg;t:
G.2 Regime (I)
We rst consider regime (I) where the government sets a constant  2 (0; 1) and adjusts
public investment. As in the basic model, using the budget constraint of the representative
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household, we can obtain government expenditure per GDP as a function of (bt; nt; ct):
gt = g(bt; nt; ct) =
kg(nt)
kg(nt)  bt + "(nt)1  (bt nt)kg(nt)nt
"h
(!   r(nt)nt) 
 
(1  )r(nt) + g

bt
  (bt   b)
i
  "(nt)
1  
h
(! + r(nt)(bt   nt) + ct   !
nt
bt   (bt   b)
i#
;
where "(nt) =
r0(nt)nt
r(nt)+g
.
Together with the Euler equation, the model is reduced to a dynamic system of bt, nt,
and ct. Through some long manipulations, we obtain the following dierential equations:
_bt =  (bt   b);
_nt = (nt) (bt; nt; ct)nt;
_ct =

(1  )r(nt)  + ((nt)  1) (bt; nt; ct)  g(bt; nt; ct)kg(nt) 1 + g

ct;
where (nt) =

1  
1 "(nt)
 1
and  (bt; nt; ct) = r(nt) +
g(bt;nt;ct)
nt
  g(bt;nt;ct)
kg(nt)
+ ct !
nt
+ g.
G.3 Local Determinacy
Let (b; n; c) be the stationary point. It satises
b = b;
 (b; n; c) = 0;
(1  )r(n)    g(b; n; c)kg(n) 1 + g = 0:
Because this nonlinear system has no closed-form solution, we hereafter conduct numerical
analyses. We linearize the dynamical system around the stationary point and check the
signs of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. If the number of eigenvalues with a
negative real part is three, the stationary point is a sink. Equilibrium indeterminacy
arises because the system includes just one jumpable variable, ct.
We adopt a benchmark parameter value as follows. On the household's preference
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and the production function, we choose a popular value:  = 0:05,  = 1,  = 0:36. As
a standard income tax rate and interest rate, we set  = 0:15 and r = 0:05. Following
Chatterjee et al. (2003), we set k = 0:05, g = 0:04. We analyze the model under
various values of (;b; ) because these are key parameters. As a benchmark value, we
adopt (;b; ) = (0:05; 1; 0:1). We follow Chatterjee et al. (2003) and choose  = 0:1
in (G.1). According to the SGP, we set  = 0:05. Although the long-run target of bt is
0:6 in the SGP, we adopt b = 1. This is because the actual debt{GDP ratios in the EU
countries are distributed around 1 (with slightly large variance) and such a value ensures
some goodness of t for this model. With this parameter set, consumption{output ratio
is 0:584, capital{output ratio is 2:915, and growth rate is 0:020 in the steady state.
Figure 3:  and equilibrium determinacy
First, we explore whether adjustment speed  aects equilibrium determinacy under
an endogenously varying interest rate. Figure 3 provides the answer:  does not aect
equilibrium determinacy. As in the original model of the main text, only the directions of
the simultaneous movement of (at; bt; gt) are relevant to equilibrium determinacy. There-
fore, adjustment speed  does not aect equilibrium determinacy.
Second, we investigate the relationship between equilibrium determinacy and the re-
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Figure 4:  and equilibrium determinacy
sponse strength of the interest rate to scal conditions, . Figure 4 illustrates the same.
As  increases, the unique equilibrium area becomes larger. This result is very intuitive.
Since one of the sources of indeterminacy in a small open economy is xed interest rates,
the existence of a variable component in the interest rate weakens this indeterminacy.
However, more importantly, we should note that a variable interest rate does not elim-
inate equilibrium indeterminacy. Besides, for plausible values of , indeterminacy can
arises under a not so high b in our model. The mechanism underlying indeterminacy is
given in the main text, and is important when creating debt-policy rules.
G.4 Welfare
The lifetime utility of the representative household is
U =
Z 1
0
e t logCtdt: (G.5)
From the Euler equation, we have Ct = C0e
R t
0 c;udu, where c;u = (1   )r(nu)   . By
C0 = c0Y0 and Y0 = x

0Kg;0, we have Ct = c0x(n0)
Kg;0e
R t
0 c;udu. Substituting this into
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(G.5) and dierentiating it with respcet to b, we obtain19
@U
@b
=
1
c0
@c0
@b
+
Z 1
0
e t
Z t
0
(1  )r0(nu)@nu
@b
dudt: (G.6)
We analyze E(@U
@b
) for both cases of unique equilibrium and multiple equilibria.20
Based on the welfare analysis in the main text, we consider the following scenario.
At the initial time, the economy stays at the stationary point: b0 = b
init, n0 = n
init.
Then, the government unexpectedly marginally reduces b to bnew. Since this is a marginal
change, we may take the following approximation:
b0 = b
init  bnew = b; (G.7)
n0 = n
init  nnew = n: (G.8)
In the case of a unique equilibrium, the economy jumps into a new saddle path and mono-
tonically converges to the new stationary point. In the case of equilibrium indeterminacy,
for simplicity, we assume that a sunspot shock hits the economy only at the same time the
government reduces b. Wherever it jumps, the economy converges as in the determinate
case because the stationary point of the local dynamical system is a sink.
Case of a Unique Equilibrium
In the case of a unique equilibrium, using (G.7) and (G.8), we nd the equilibrium path
of the linearized model and substitute it into (G.6). Table 2 provides the results.21 See
the rows labeled as \D". The main ndings are as follows.
 For plausible parameter values, a marginal reduction in b worsens social welfare.
This is consistent with the result in the original model (see Proposition 4). In the
19Note that @n0
@b
= 0 because nt is a predetermined variable.
20In the case of multiple equilibria, we focus on solutions with sunspot shocks. Therefore, the partial
derivative should be evaluated by the expected value. In the case of a unique equilibrium, the model does
not contain any stochastic component.
21Because we should treat both cases of unique and multiple equilibria and the threshold (with respect
to b) depends strongly on , we properly change the sets of alternative values of b according to the values
of  as described in Table 1.
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 b D or I 0:01 0:025 0:05 0:075 0:1 0:2
0 0.45 D -212.15 -525.36 -1034.43 -1527.95 -2006.63 -3785.51
0.5 I/N 510.21 1279.55 2575.53 3894.83 5225.15 10750.92
I/U 509.86 1279.57 2576.57 3893.95 5228.69 10755.31
0.55 I/N 96.67 247.11 514.38 802.92 1118.72 2709.08
I/U 96.88 247.04 513.95 804.05 1119.22 2709.03
0.075 0.55 D -1.51 -3.62 -6.95 -10.17 -13.33 -25.44
0.6 D -1.86 -4.50 -8.67 -12.96 -17.14 -33.77
0.65 I/N -17.49 -45.24 -93.99 -149.50 -210.91 -546.70
I/U -17.92 -45.32 -94.59 -149.87 -211.67 -546.47
0.1 0.55 D -1.02 -2.38 -4.47 -6.46 -8.39 -15.65
0.6 D -1.17 -2.77 -5.25 -7.65 -9.99 -19.05
0.65 I/N -37.13 -94.53 -200.37 -320.06 -455.25 -1256.82
I/U -37.47 -94.82 -200.73 -319.97 -455.54 -1257.18
0.125 0.65 D -0.95 -2.21 -4.13 -5.97 -7.77 -14.71
0.7 D -1.11 -2.61 -4.94 -7.21 -9.46 -18.38
0.75 I/N -4.10 -9.75 -20.06 -31.30 -42.95 -104.79
I/U -3.98 -9.96 -20.30 -31.20 -43.31 -104.97
1.5 0.75 D -0.90 -2.07 -3.85 -5.55 -7.23 -13.82
0.8 I/N -3.17 -7.86 -16.00 -25.06 -34.39 -83.65
I/U -3.26 -7.69 -15.89 -24.59 -34.40 -83.65
0.85 I/N -2.05 -5.83 -12.02 -18.34 -24.76 -56.51
I/U -2.61 -5.91 -11.42 -18.32 -24.86 -57.10
Table 2: E(@U
@b
) given (;b; ). D (I) means equilibrium is determinate (indeterminate)
under (;b). N (U) means sunspot shocks follow a normal distribution (uniform distribu-
tion). Note that  does not aect equilibrium determinacy.
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original model, a reduction in b has a detrimental eect, if r < !(= 1   ), which
widely holds in usual cases. Inequality r < !(= 1  ) also holds in this numerical
analysis, and accordingly, a marginal reduction in b worsens social welfare.
 The role of adjustment speed too is similar to that in the case of xed interest rates.
We can conclude that at least with regard to the qualitative aspect, the welfare
eect of a reduction in b and the mechanism underlying it do not change basically
even under an endogenous interest rate.
 The welfare implication of a change in (b; ) is similar to the basic model in which
the interest rate is perfectly xed.
 The existence of a variable component in the interest rate (i.e.,  > 0) yields a
quantitatively crucial eect on social welfare.22 This is because the mechanism
underlying the welfare implication in the basic model depends on the assumption
that the interest rate is perfectly xed. Thus, it is natural that the absolute value
of the welfare eect is decreasing in the degree of variability of the interest rate.
Case of Multiple Equilibria
In the case of multiple equilibria, we consider sunspot solutions.23 Denote the three
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix by 1, 2, and 3 and the associated eigenvectors by
v1, v2, and v3, respectively. The general solution of the linearized model is
zt = z
 + 1 exp(1t)v1 + 2 exp(2t)v2 + 3 exp(3t)v3; (G.9)
where zt = (bt; nt; ct)
0, z = (b; n; c)0, and 1, 2, and 3 are coecients. Because one of
the eigenvalues is   < 0, we may set 1 =  . In the case of indeterminacy, Re(2) < 0
and Re(3) < 0, where Re(i) is the real part of i. Suppose that coecient 2 in (G.9) is
a random variable that generates a sunspot shock that hits the economy only at the initial
22Note that this model coincides with the original model in the main text if  = 0.
23We use the method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) to compose sunspot equilibria.
36
time at which the government sets a new long-run target for the debt{GDP ratio.24 We
consider the cases where 2 is (i) normally distributed such a way that c0 jumps into the
range [0:95c; 1:05c] with probability greater than 0:999 and (ii) is uniformly distributed
over [0:97c; 1:03c]. Since c0 is now a random variable, we should consider an expected
welfare eect for a marginal reduction in b: E(@U
@b
). In Table 2, the rows labeled \I"
present the results for this analysis. Labels, \N" and \U" indicate that sunspot shocks
follow a normal and uniform distribution, respectively. The main ndings are as follows.
 Both the distributions yield qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Al-
though the welfare eect in general varies for each realization of 2, the expected
value is stable due to the symmetry of the distributions. We conjecture that this
is from sunspot shocks following any symmetric distributions with suciently small
variances.
 Except for the case of  = 0, the relationships between adjustment speed  and
welfare eect E(@U
@b
) are similar to that in the case of equilibrium determinacy and
hence the original model. In the case of  = 0, the sign of E(@U
@b
) reverses. Its
absolute value increases in  even in this case.25
G.5 Regime (II)
We now consider regime (II) where  is endogenous and g = G=Y is exogenous. The
dynamics system is given by
_bt =  (bt   b);
_nt = (nt)	(bt; nt; ct)nt;
_ct =

(1  (bt; nt; ct))r(nt)  + ((nt)  1)	(bt; nt; ct)  gkg(nt) 1 + g

ct;
24According to the dynamical equations, 1 = b0   b. Given 2, the value of 3 is determined so that
the initial value satises (G.9) .
25We obtain similar results for suciently small values of  > 0, for example,  = 10 5. Thus, the
welfare eect seems to have continuity at  = 0 with respect to . Besides, similar results hold when
there are no sunspot shocks. The phase diagram seems to exhibit some complicated changes between the
cases of a saddle and sink nearby  = 0.
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where (nt) =

1   
1 "(nt)
 1
and 	(bt; nt; ct) = r(nt) +
g
nt
  g
kg(nt)
+ ct !
nt
+ g. The
tax rate is a function of bt, nt, and ct:
(bt; nt; ct) =
(r(nt) +

1 "(nt)
_nt
nt
  gkg(nt) 1 + g)bt + g   (bt   b)
r(nt)(bt   nt) + ! :
We derive the steady state where _bt = _nt = _ct = 0. From _nt = 	(bt; nt; ct) = 0 and
_ct = 0, we obtain
 = 1  1
r(n)

+
g
kg(n)
  g

: (G.10)
If r is xed, the right-hand side (RHS) of (G.10) is constant. If r0(n) > 0, the RHS is
an increasing function of n as long as the long-run growth rate,  = g
kg(n)
  g, is strictly
positive. From the denition of nt = bt   at, we have _at = 0 in the steady state, which
implies c = (b  n) + (1  )!. Using this equation and _nt = 	(bt; nt; ct) = 0, we obtain
 =
b+ 
!   r(n)n: (G.11)
Irrespective of whether r0(n) > 0 or r0(n) = 0, there exists a unique n such that ! = r(n)n
and the denominator of the RHS is strictly positive if n < n. The RHS of (G.11) increases
with n. Equations (G.10) and (G.11) determine the steady-state value of n.
As shown in Proposition 5 of the main text, if r is xed, there exists a unique steady
state. Point A in panel (a) of Figure 5 corresponds to this steady state. The curve of
(G.11) intersects that of (G.10) from below, at the steady state. The main text shows
that this steady state is unstable. Even when r increases with n, there exists a steady
state where the curve of (G.11) intersects that of (G.10) from below (see Point B in panel
(b) of Figure 5).
To examine the stability of this steady state, we use the specication of (G.1). As
in Subsection G.2, we assume  = 0:05,  = 0:36, k = 0:05, g = 0:04,  = 0:05, and
r = 0:05. To ensure positive growth, we use  = 1:3. We set g = 0:038. The values of b
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Figure 5: Steady-state equilibrium under regime (II)
range from 0.1 to 3. We linearly approximate the dynamic system around this steady state
and then calculate the eigenvalues for  = 0:1 and  = 0:2. Our calculation shows that
for all values of b, this steady state is unstable. For example, when  = 0:1 and b = 0:6,
the Jacobian of the linearized system has the following eigenvalues: 0.866, 0.0757, -0.05.
This result shows that even when r is endogenously determined, the steady state may be
unstable for a wide range of parameters.
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